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Abstract. This paper presents a well-founded language allowing in one
hand data owners to easily specify their security and utility requirements
over the data to be outsourced and in an another hand to formalize the
set of security mechanisms that can be used for the protection of out-
sourced data. Based on the formalization of security and utility require-
ments and security mechanisms properties, we formally identify the best
mechanisms, and the best way to combine them to get the best trade-off
between utility and security.
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1 Introduction
Because of the rapid evolution of communication technologies, data storage and
data processing, outsourcing data to a third-party has grown up over the last
few years. Information system architecture adopted by public and private com-
panies is changing for mainly two causes. First, it offers several advantages to
the client companies, especially for small ones with limited IT budget as it allows
them to reduce the cost of maintaining computing infrastructure and data-rich
applications. Second, data collected by companies generally contain sensitive
information which must be protected.
Data outsourcing gives rise to many security issues, e.g., confidentiality, in-
tegrity, authentication, copyright protection, privacy and anonymity, because
outsourced data contains often highly sensitive information which will be stored
and managed by third parties. These security issues are traditionally addressed
by using security and cryptography mechanisms such as encryption, anonymiza-
tion, watermarking, fragmentation, etc. In our work, we consider that the set
of security mechanisms that can be used for the protection of outsourced data
are represented as a toolbox giving security administrators the ability to en-
force their security requirements. We develop a logic-based language allowing
the security administrators to specify their security and utility requirements
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and automatically choose the best mechanisms, and the best way to combine
them in order to enforce defined security requirements.
As a case of study, we address the problem of secure data integration in
which two data owners storing two private tables having the same set of records
on different sets of attributes want to create a joint table containing involved
attributes of both private tables. The joint table must satisfy the set of security
and utility requirements defined by both data owners. To meet these goals, we
first develop a well-founded logic based language allowing to model the used
system, the security and utility requirements defined by both data owners, and
the security mechanisms that can be used to satisfy them. Second, we show how
to use those specifications to choose the best combination of security mechanisms
that can satisfy the selected security and utility requirements defined by both
data owners.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows, Section 2 discusses related
work. Section 3 describes our approach. Section 4 presents our defined language
and the specification of the used system. Section 5 shows the modeling of the
policy to be applied over the outsourced information. Section 6 presents the
specification of the security mechanisms that can be used to satisfy a defined
policy. Section 7 shows how to choose the best combination of security mecha-
nisms that can satisfy a defined policy. Section 8 gives a demonstration of our
approach. Finally, Section 9 reports our conclusions.
2 Related work
Many approaches to protect confidentiality and privacy of outsourced data are
based on encryption [5,9,10]. Hacigu¨mu¨s et al. [9] have proposed the first ap-
proach aiming to query encrypted data. The proposed technique is based on
the definition of a number of buckets on the attribute domain which allows the
server-side evaluation of point queries. Hore et al. [10] improve the bucket-based
index methods by presenting an efficient method for partitioning the domain
of attributes. Many interesting techniques providing protection of outsourced
data are based on order preserving encryption OPE schemes [5]. OPE schemes
are symmetric-key deterministic encryption schemes which produce cipher-texts
that preserve the order of the plain-texts. However, in all mentioned approaches,
authors use only encryption to protect sensitive outsourced data which makes
query execution on the outsourced encrypted data much more difficult.
Few research efforts have investigated how to combine security mechanisms
to protect sensitive outsourced data. In [6], authors combine data fragmentation
together with encryption to ensure confidentiality of outsourced mono-relational
database. This approach was improved in [1] by combining the best features of
encryption and fragmentation to deal efficiently with multi-relation normalized
databases. Popa et al. [15] propose an interesting approach called CryptDB.
The proposed system relies on a trusted party containing a proxy server allow-
ing the interception of users queries which will be executed over the protected
databases. The proxy stores a set of encryption keys allowing to encrypt and
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decrypt data and queries. In order to allow the execution of different kind of
SQL queries, CryptDB system combines different encryption schemes. For range
query, it use an implementation of the Order Preserving Encryption (OPE) [5],
computations on numeric data are supported using homomorphic encryption
based on the Paillier cryptosystem [14] and matching keywords are supported
using searchable encryption [17]. The CryptDB approach offers a solution to the
encryption type selection problem by proposing an adaptive scheme that dy-
namically adjusts encryption strategies. The idea of this approach is to encrypt
each data item in many onions: onion for equal and order comparison, onion for
aggregate operations and onion for word search operations. In each onion, the
values is dressed in layers of increasingly stronger encryption, each of these layers
provides certain kind of functionality. This approach has two main drawbacks.
First, it will significantly increase the size of the encrypted database. Second, in
order to enable certain functionality, some encryption layers must be removed
by updating the database which can be, for big databases, very expensive in
terms of execution time.
Formal verification of security protocols [3,4] has been extensively used to
verify security properties such as secrecy [3] and strong secrecy [4]. A secu-
rity protocol involves two or more principal actors, these actors are classified
into honest actors aiming to securely exchange information and dishonest actors
(attackers) aiming to subvert the protocol. Therefore, dishonest actors are not
constrained to follow the protocol rules. Despite that formal verification-based
approaches are efficient in security properties verification, they cannot be used in
our case as we consider that the actors are honest-but-curious. They are honest
as they are constrained to follow the chosen combination of security mechanisms
and they are curious in that they will try to infer protected sensitive information
by analyzing the joined table.
3 Proposed approach
In our approach, we strive to design a support tool allowing, for a given security
policy, selection of the best combination of mechanisms to enforce this security
policy. To achieve this goal, we suggest the following methodology :
– Using an Epistemic Linear Temporal Logic, we defined an expressive lan-
guage allowing to formally model a system composed of involved entities
and the data on which the security policy should be enforced, and formally
express the security policy defined by the security administrators.
– We conducted a formal study of the security mechanisms allowing the achieve-
ment of a chosen goal. This formal study enables us to extract the security
and utility properties that characterize each security mechanism. These prop-
erties are formally expressed using our language.
– Based on the system formalization, the security policy formalization and
the security mechanisms properties formalization, we formally identify the
relevant combination of mechanisms to efficiently enforce the defined security
policy.
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4 System specification using Epistemic LTL
In this section, we will define and use the language L to formalize our system.
In particular, we will define axioms which describe the basic knowledge of each
agent and the formalization of the chosen goal.
4.1 Syntax and semantics
The first-order temporal epistemic language L is made up of a set of predicates
P, propositional connectives ∨, ∧, ¬, → and ↔, the quantifiers ∀, ∃. We take
the usual set of future connectives © (next), ♦ (Sometime, or eventually), 
(always) [8]. For knowledge we assume a set of agents Ag = {1, · · · ,m} and use
a set of unary modal connectives Kj , for j ∈ Ag, in which a formula Kjψ is to
be read as “agent j knows ψ”.
Definition 1. Let ϕ and ψ be propositions and Pi be a predicate of arity n in
P. The set of well-formed formulas of L is defined as follows:
φ ::= Pi(t1, · · · , tn)| Kiψ| ¬ϕ| ϕ ∨ ψ| ϕ ∧ ψ| © ϕ| ♦ϕ| ϕ|ϕ→ ψ| ϕ↔ ψ | ∃xψ | ∀xψ
Definition 2. An interpretation of the language L is the triple K = (W, I, Φ)
consisting of a sequence of states W = {w0, w1, · · · }, a set of classical first-order
structures I that assigns for each states wi ∈ W a predicate Iwi(P ) : |Iwi |
n →
{True, False} for each n-places predicate P ∈ P and Φ a transition function
which defines transitions between states due to the application of mechanisms
(actions). Φ(wi,mk) = wj if the mechanism mk transits our system from states
wi to state wj.
Definition 3. Let W be a sequence of states, wi (i ≥ 0) denote a state of W
and v an assignment. The satisfaction relation |= for a formula ψ of L is defined
as follows:
– (wi,W) |= P (t1, · · · , tn) ⇐⇒ Iwi(P )(v(t1), · · · , v(tn)) = True
– (wi,W) |= ¬ψ ⇐⇒ (wi,W) 6|= ψ
– (wi,W) |= ψ → ϕ ⇐⇒ (wi,W) 6|= ψ or (wi,W) |= ϕ
– (wi,W) |= ψ ↔ ϕ ⇐⇒ (wi,W) |= (ψ → ϕ) ∧ (ϕ→ ψ)
– (wi,W) |= ∀xψ ⇐⇒ (wi,W) |= ψ[x/c] for all c ∈ |Iwi |
– (wi,W) |= ψ ∧ ϕ⇐⇒ (wi,W) |= ψ and (wi,W) |= ϕ
– (wi,W) |= ψ ∨ ϕ⇐⇒ (wi,W) |= ψ or (wi,W) |= ϕ
– (wi,W) |=©ψ ⇐⇒ (wi+1,W) |= ψ
– (wi,W) |= ♦ψ ⇐⇒ (wk,W) |= ψ for some k ≥ i
– (wi,W) |= ψ ⇐⇒ (wk,W) |= ψ for all k ≥ i
In our approach, we choose to work with relational databases which are
composed of tables, attributes, records and values. We suppose that relational
databases schemes are known to all agents in the system. Epistemic operator
K is only used to represents the knowledge of relation between objects (at-
tribute and records) and values which represent an instantiations of these ob-
jects. These relations are represented using the three-places predicates valueOf ,
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valueOf(R,A, V ) is to be read “the value of the attribute A in the record R is
V ”. In order to simplify our language L, we transform the epistemic operator K
using the two-places predicate knows as following:
Ki valueOf(R,A, V )→ valueOf(R,A, V ) ∧ knows(i, V ) (1)
knows(i, v) is to be read “the agent i knows V ”.
4.2 Data model
A system S = 〈O, T ,A,R,V〉 consists of a finite set of owners O, a finite set of
relational tables T , a finite set of attributes A, a finite set of records R and a
finite set of values V. We use the following syntactic conventions. Let O1, O2, · · ·
be variables over owners O, T1, T2, · · · be variables over relational tables T ,
A1, A2, · · · be variables over attributes A, R1, R2, · · · be variables over records
R and V1, V2, · · · be variables over the set of values V. We identify the following
predicates :
– belongs(O1, T1) is satisfied if the owner of the relational table T1 is O1.
– attribute of(T1, A1) is satisfied if A1 is an attribute of the relational table
T1.
– recordOf(T1, R1) is satisfied if R1 is a record of the relational table T1.
– valueOf(R1, A1, V1) is satisfied if V1 is the value of the attribute A1 in the
record R1.
We denote by Σ the set of formulas representing the formalization of our system
using previous predicates. We suppose that the set of formulas Σ are always true
in the system (e.g., the table T belongs to the owner O and will belong always
to the owner O). This can be formalized as follows:
∀f ∈ Σ. (w0,W) |= f (2)
4.3 Specifying Basic Knowledge Axioms
In our system, we consider each data owner as an agent. An owner’s knowledge
is specified using the following axioms:
∀T1, O1, A1, R1, V1. [ belongs(O1, T1) ∧ attribute of(T1, A1) ∧
recordOf(T1, R1) ∧ valueOf(R1, A1, V1)→ knows(O1, V1) ]
(3)
∀T1, O1, A1, R1, V1. [ ¬belongs(O1, T1) ∧ attribute of(T1, A1) ∧
recordOf(T1, R1) ∧ valueOf(R1, A1, V1)→ ¬knows(O1, V1) ]
(4)
∀O1, V1. knows(O1, V1)→ © knows(O1, V1) (5)
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∀O, T1, R,A, V. attribute of(T1, A) ∧ recordOf(T1, R) ∧ valueOf(R,A, V )∧
knows(O, V )↔ belongs(O, T1) ∨
(
∃T2, T3.belongs(O, T2) ∧ joinOf(T1, T2, T3)
∧join involved(T1, A) ∧ ¬protected(T1, A,O)
)
(6)
Axiom 3 means that an owner knows all information stored in tables that
belong to him while axiom 4 means that an owner has no knowledge about the
information stored in tables that do not belong to him. Axiom 5 states that data
owners never forget information they know. Axiom 6 means that an owner O
knows the values assumed by an attribute A of the table T1 if and only if the
table T1 belongs to the owner O or there exists a table T3 representing the join
of a table T2 and the table T1 in which the attribute A is not protected.
4.4 Goal representation
According to our scenario, the goal consists in joining two private relational
tables. This goal is specified using the axioms 7 and 8 in which we use the
following predicates:
– join(T1, T2) is satisfied if both owners of T1 and T2 want to join their private
tables T1 and T2.
– joinAttribute(T1, T2, A1) is satisfied if the tables T1 and T2 are joined over
the attribute A1.
– join involved(T1, A1) is satisfied if the attribute A1 of the table T1 is in-
volved in join operations. This predicate allows us to specify which are the
attributes concerned by the joint.
Axiom 7 states that if the data owners of two tables T1 and T2 want to integrate
their private data then eventually, there will exist a table Tj representing the
join of T1 and T2. Axiom 8 states that the set of attributes of the joined table
Tj is composed of the union of sets of join-involved attributes of private tables
T1 and T2.
∀T1, T2. join(T1, T2) → ♦
(
∃T3 JoinOf(T1, T2, T3)
)
(7)
∀T1, T2, Tj , A. JoinOf(T1, T2, Tj) ∧
(
join involved(T1, A) ∨
join involved(T2, A)
)
→ attribute of(Tj , A)
(8)
5 Security policy specification
The policy to be deployed is composed of a set of abstract-level constraints.
Using these constraints, data owners will be able to model in a quite simple
and powerful way, their security and utility requirements. In this section, we
present different kinds of constraints: security constraint and utility constraint.
We present for each kind of constraint the abstract-level representation and their
corresponding transformation to the concrete level.
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5.1 Security Constraint
Confidentiality Constraint: Using confidentiality constraint, a data owner
will be able to require that the values assumed by some attributes are sensi-
tive and therefore must be protected. For this purpose, we define the two-places
predicate SAttributeOf . The formula SAttributeOf(t, a) means that “The at-
tribute a of the table t is a sensitive attribute”. A confidentiality constraint is
transformed to the concrete level using the following rule:
∀A, T. SAttributeOf(T,A)→  [∀O,R, V.recordOf(T,R) ∧
valueOf(R,A, V ) ∧ ¬belongs(O, T ) → ¬knows(O, V )]
(9)
Anonymization constraints: Using this kind of constraints, a data owner will
be able to require the prevention of identity disclosure by protecting personal
identifiers. We define the one-place predicate withoutIDDisclosure. Thus, the
formula withoutIDDisclosure(t) is to be read “Prevent identity disclosure in
the table t”. An Anonymization constraint is transformed to the concrete level
using the following rule:
∀T. withoutIDDisclosure(T )→ 
(
∀A,O,R, V. IDAttributeOf(T,A)
∧ recordOf(T,R) ∧ valueOf(R,A, V ) ∧ ¬belongs(O, T ) → ¬knows(O, V )
) (10)
5.2 Utility Constraint
Confidentiality and privacy protection is offered at the expense of data utility.
Utility constraint gives the ability to a data owner to require that particular
properties on data must be respected. The violation of these properties makes
the data useless. As we work with relational databases, utility requirements are
properties allowing the data owner to execute certain kind of queries over the
protected data. These utility requirements can be classified into four classes.
Equality check requirements. With this kind of requirements, a data owner
wants to be able to perform equality checks, which means that he or she wants
to be able to perform selects with equality predicates, equality joins, etc.
Order check requirements. A data owner can use this kind of requirement
in order to perform order check, which means that he or she wants to have the
ability to execute range queries, order joins, ORDER BY, MIN, MAX, etc.
Computational requirements. With this kind of requirements, a data owner
wants to have the ability to perform computation over encrypted data, which
means the ability to execute queries with SUM, AVG, etc.
Keyword search requirements. Using keyword search requirements, a data
owner wants to have the ability to perform keyword based search over the en-
crypted data (e.g, to check if a word exists in an encrypted text).
To be able to express these different kinds of utility requirements, we define
the one place predicate utility requirement(). Then, an utility constraint defined
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over the attribute A can be expressed by the axiom 11, which is to be read: “the
ability to perform the utility requirement U over the attribute A”.
utility requirement(req) ∧ provides(req, o) (11)
6 Security mechanisms specification
Security policies are enforced through the application of security mechanisms
which can be methods or approaches for supporting the requirements of the
security policies. Each security policy is specified using three groups of formulas:
preconditions formulas, effects formulas, and properties formulas.
Preconditions. For each security mechanism, preconditions are represented
by a set of formulas which are necessary conditions under which the security
mechanism can be applied. We define the two-places predicated is applicable.
The formula is applicable(M,O) is to be read “the mechanismM can be applied
over the object O”, O can be a table, an attribute, or a value. Preconditions of
a security mechanism M are specified using a formula of the following form:
 (is applicable(M,O) → ∆M ) (12)
Where ∆M represents necessary conditions for the applicability of the mecha-
nism M . A formula of the form 12 is to be read “At any state of the system,
M can be applied if the preconditions ∆M hold”.
Effects. Effects of the application of a mechanism M that transits the system
from a state wi to a state wj are modifications applied to the system during this
transition. We use the two-places predicate apply(M,O) to say that the mecha-
nismM is applied over the object O. For a mechanismM , effects are represented
by a set of formulas ΣM such that:
Φ(wi, apply(M,O)) = wj → (wj |= ΣM ) (13)
Axiom 13 states that if the application of the mechanism M over the object O
transits the system from a state wi to a state wj , therefore the set of effects ΣM
of the application of the mechanism M is satisfied on the state wj .
Properties. The set of security and utility properties P1, · · · , Pn that can be
derived from the effects of the mechanism application.
ΣM →
n∧
i=1
Pi (14)
In our approach, security policies are composed mainly of confidentiality con-
straints and anonymization constraints. In the next section, we specify using the
three previously presented groups of formulas (preconditions, effects, and prop-
erties) the set of security mechanisms that can be used to enforce the security
policy. We classify these security mechanisms into encryption-based mechanisms
and anonymization-based mechanisms.
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6.1 Encryption-based mechanism specification
Encryption-based security mechanism can be classified using two main factors:
the security properties they offer and the level of security they provide (e.g, the
amount of information revealed about the encrypted data). Encryption-based
security mechanisms are to be applied over an attribute A if the following pre-
conditions hold: (1) the attribute A is considered sensitive, (2) the attribute A
is involved in the joint table. This can be specified as follows:

[
∀M,A. enc based mechanism(M) ∧ is applicable(M,A) →
∃T. SAttributeOf(T,A) ∧ join involved(T,A)
] (15)
The effects of the application of encryption-based mechanisms are specified using
the following axiom:
∀M,A, T,K. enc based mechanism(M) ∧ attribute of(T,A) ∧
enc key(K) ∧ apply(M,A)→ encrypted(T,A,K)
(16)
Once we have defined the above axiom describing the effects of encryption-based
mechanisms, we can specify the conditions under which an encryption-based
mechanism can protect the values of an attribute. Obliviously, the values of
an attribute over which an encryption-based mechanism is applied are protected
from unauthorized data owners if those data owners have no knowledge about the
used encrypted key (axiom 17). An attribute is protected from an unauthorized
data owner means that this data owner has no knowledge about the values of
the protected attribute (axiom 18).
∀A, T,K,O. enc key(K) ∧ encrypted(T,A,K) ∧ ¬knows(O,K)→
protected(T,A,O)
(17)
∀A, T,O,R, V. protected(T,A,O) ∧ recordOf(T,R)∧
valueOf(R,A, V ) → ¬knows(O, V )
(18)
Encryption-based mechanisms can be classified using the security properties they
offer into four categories: deterministic encryption based mechanisms, order-
preserving encryption based mechanisms, homomorphic encryption based mech-
anisms, and searchable encryption based mechanisms. For each of these four cat-
egories, we formalize the security and utility properties that characterize them.
Deterministic encryption based mechanisms: Deterministic encryption
based mechanisms allow logarithmic time equality check over encrypted data.
This means that it can perform select queries with equality predicates, equal-
ity joins, etc. Deterministic encryption based mechanisms cannot achieve the
classical notions of security of probabilistic encryption because it leaks which
encrypted values correspond to the same plaintext value. Therefore, each at-
tribute over which a deterministic encryption based mechanism is applied will
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have the deterministic (det) security level (axiom 19).
∀M,A. det enc mechanism(M) ∧ apply(M,A)→
provides(equality check,A) ∧ sec level(A, det)
(19)
Order-preserving encryption based mechanisms: Order preserving sym-
metric encryption (OPE) mechanisms are based on deterministic symmetric en-
cryption schemes which produce encrypted values that preserve numerical or-
dering of the plaintext values. OPE mechanisms are weaker than deterministic
encryption based mechanisms as they leak the order between plaintext values.
Based on this fact, each attribute over which an OPE mechanism is applied will
have the order-preserving (ope) security level (axiom 20).
∀M,A. ope mechanism(M) ∧ apply(M,A)→ sec level(A, ope) ∧
provides(equality check,A) ∧ provides(order check,A)
(20)
Homomorphic encryption based mechanisms: Homomorphic encryption
mechanisms are based on secure probabilistic encryption schemes which enable
to perform computation over encrypted data. For efficiency, we suppose that
we will use mechanisms based on partially homomorphic encryption as fully ho-
momorphic encryption schemes have a long way to go before they can be used
in practice [13]. In our approach, we will use mechanisms based on Paillier
cryptosystem [14] to support summation. Paillier cryptosystem provides indis-
tinguishability under an adaptive chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA). There-
fore, each attribute over which an Homomorphic encryption based mechanisms
is applied will have the probabilistic (prob) security level (axiom 21).
∀M,A. hom mechanism(M) ∧ apply(M,A)→
sec level(A, prob) ∧ provides(addition,A)
(21)
Searchable encryption based mechanisms: Searchable encryption mecha-
nisms allow searching for keywords on an encrypted database without revealing
the keyword. Therefore, this kind of mechanisms can be used to perform opera-
tions such as SQL’s LIKE operator. We suppose that we will use the SEARCH
mechanism defined in [18] which is proved to be nearly as secure as a proba-
bilistic encryption. Based on this fact, each attribute over which the SEARCH
mechanism is applied will have the probabilistic (prob) security level. Properties
of the SEARCH-based mechanism is specified as follows:
∀A. searchable enc mechanism(SEARCH) ∧ apply(SEARCH,A)→
sec level(A, prob) ∧ provides(keywork search,A)
(22)
6.2 Anonymization-based mechanism specification
The anonymization technique aims to prevent identity disclosure by protecting
personal identifier. To meet this requirement, we use the existing anonymization
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approach k-anonymity [16] in which identifier attributes values are removed from
the private table (axiom 25). However, a Quasi-identifier attribute value in the
released table may lead to infer the value of removed identifier attributes (axiom
23). Therefore, Quasi-identifier attributes values are generalized (axiom 26) in
such a way that removed identifier attributes values cannot be recovered.
∀O, T1, A1, V1, R. IDAttributeOf(T1, A1) ∧ recordOf(T1, R) ∧
valueOf(R,A1, V1) ∧ knows(O, V1)↔ belongs(T1, O) ∨[
∃T2, T3. belongs(O, T2) ∧ joinOf(T1, T2, T3) ∧
(
join involved(T1, A1)
∨ (∃A2. QIDAttributeOf(T1, A2) ∧ ¬ anonymized(T1, A2))
)]
(23)
Anonymization mechanism is applied over a table T if and only if the table
T contains at least an identifier attribute or a quasi-identifier attribute. These
preconditions is specified as follows:

[
∀T. is applicable(kanonymity, T )→ ∃A.(IDAttributeOf(T,A) ∨
QIDAttributeOf(T,A)) ∧ ¬ encrypted(T,A)
] (24)
Effects of the application of Anonymization mechanism over a table T are spec-
ified using the following axioms:
∀A. IDAttributeOf(T,A)→ ¬ join involved(T,A) (25)
∀A.QIDAttributeOf(T,A) ∧ join involved(T,A)→ anonymized(T,A) (26)
The use of anonymization mechanisms such as k-anonymity offers the data
owner the ability to ensure the prevention of identities disclosure by protect-
ing personal identifiers at the same time supporting data analysis (e.g., data
mining). In terms of security, anonymization based mechanisms are weaker than
encryption based mechanisms as anonymized data can sometimes be re-identified
with particular individuals by using homogeneity Attack or Background Knowl-
edge Attack [12]. Based on this fact, each protected identifier attribute will have
the anonymization (anonym) security level. Properties of anonymization-based
mechanism is specified as follows:
∀M,T.anon mechanism(M) ∧ apply(M,T )→
provides(data analysis, T ) ∧
(
∀A,O.IDAttributeOf(T,A) ∧ ¬
belongs(T,O)→ protected(T,A,O) ∧ sec level(anonym,A)
) (27)
In order to compare different security levels provided by previously presented
security mechanisms, we define the transitive predicate more secure than. The
formula more secure than(l1, l2) is to be read: “the level l1 is more secure than
the level l2”. A mechanism M1 is more secure than a mechanism M2 if the
application ofM1 leaks less information about sensitive data than the application
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of M2. Therefore, based on the amount of leaked information, we define a rule
(axiom 28) stating that: probabilistic security level prob is more secure than
deterministic security level det, the deterministic security level det is more secure
than the order-preserving security level ope, and the order-preserving security
level ope is more secure than the anonymization security level anonym.
more secure than(prob, det) ∧more secure than(det, ope)
∧more secure than(ope, anonym)
(28)
7 Choosing the right mechanisms
The right mechanism or combination of mechanisms is the one that fits in the
best way the sets of security and utility constraints. As we have seen in the
previous section, each security mechanism offers a different level of protection
and a different kind of utility properties. The main challenge then is to choose
the best mechanisms allowing the satisfaction of the chosen goal while enforcing
the defined security policy. In our scenario, security issues come when data is
joined. Before applying the joint operation, security constraints are satisfied.
This hypothesis is also suitable in the general case of data outsourcing. As we
can consider that, since the data is not outsourced, there is no security issue to
worry about. Based on this, we defined several steps allowing the selection of
the mechanisms to be applied.
7.1 First step: Satisfy the chosen goal.
We look for the mechanisms that satisfy the chosen goal. For instance, in our
scenario, we look for the suitable join method that can join the data of the two
private tables. Formally speaking, a mechanismMg satisfies a goal G if from the
specification of our system Σ and the effects of the mechanism ΣMg we are able
to deduce the set of formula representing the goal G (29).
Σ ∪ ΣMg ⊢ ΣG (29)
7.2 Second step: Violated security constraints.
After getting the set of mechanismsM that can be applied to achieve the chosen
goal, we start looking for the set of violated security and utility constraints for
each mechanism Mg ∈ M. A constraint C is violated while the chosen goal
G is satisfied if from the specification of our system Σ, the effects ΣMg of the
mechanismMg and the set of formulas ΣC representing the constraint C we can
deduce a logic contradiction. This is can be formally represented as follows:
Σ ∪ ΣMG ∪ ΣC ⊢ ⊥ (30)
Obviously, our toolbox may contain several mechanisms that can satisfy the
chosen goal. In that case, we should be able to choose the best one.
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Definition 4 (Best goal satisfier). Given the set of mechanismsM = {M1, · · ·
,Mn} that can be used to satisfy the defined goal G. Let Ci be the set of violated
constraints while applying the mechanism Mi. A mechanism Mj is a best goal
satisfier if the following condition holds:
∀i ∈ {1, · · · , n}. |Cj | ≤ |Ci|, where |Ci| is the cardinality of Ci.
7.3 Third step: Satisfying the violated constraints.
Once we get the best goal satisfier Mbgs for a defined goal G and the corre-
sponding set of violated security and utility constraints C, the challenge then
is to, for each violated security constraint, looking for the properties that can
satisfy that constraint. Formally speaking, a set of l properties P = {P1, · · · , Pl}
satisfies a security constraint C in a state of the system if from: (1) the sets of
formulas ΣP1 , · · · , ΣPl representing respectively the specification of the proper-
ties P1, · · · , Pl, (2) the set of formulas Σ representing the system specification,
and (3) the set of formulas ΣMbgs representing the effects of Mbgs, we are able
to deduce the set of formulas ΣC representing the specification of the constraint
C. This is can be formalized as follows:
l∧
i=1
ΣPi ∪ Σ ∪ ΣMbgs ⊢ ΣC (31)
Informally, 31 means that if the set of security properties P is provided, the
application of the Mbgs will not violate the security constraint C.
7.4 Fourth step: Choosing the best security mechanisms.
The previous steps allow us to select the best goal satisfier Mbgs that can satisfy
the goal G, the corresponding set of violated security and utility constraints C,
and for each security constraint Ci ∈ C, we select the set of properties Pi that
can satisfy Ci when applying theMbgs. Now, based on those properties, the main
goal is to select from our toolbox, the best combination of security mechanisms
that can usefully satisfy each violated constraint in C.
Definition 5 (Useful satisfaction). Given a violated security constraint C
defined over an object (table or attribute) Ob, the set of security properties P
that satisfy C, and the set of utility constraint UOb defined over the object Ob.
A combination of mechanisms MC usefully satisfy the constraint C if:
Σ ∪
{ ∧
M∈MC
apply(M,Ob)
}
|=
( ∧
P∈P
P
∧
U∈UOb
provides(U,Ob)
)
(32)
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Definition 6. Given a violated security constraint C, the set of properties P that
satisfy C, and a combination of mechanisms CM = {M1, · · · ,Mn} that usefully
satisfy C. The security level l provided by the combination of mechanisms CM
is the lowest level provided by the application of set of mechanisms M1, · · · ,Mn.
Σ ∪
{
∀Ob.
n∧
i=1
apply(M,Ob)
}
|=
(
∀l′. sec level(l, Ob) ∧ sec level(l′, Ob)→ more secure than(l′, l)
) (33)
Definition 7 (Best combination of mechanisms). Given a violated security
constraint C and the set of properties P that can satisfy C. Suppose that we find
several combinations of security mechanisms CM1, · · · , CMn that provide the
set of properties P. Suppose that the set of combinations of security mechanisms
CM1, · · · , CMn provides respectively the set of security levels l1, · · · , ln. The
combination of mechanisms CMi is the best combination of mechanisms if it
has the highest provided security level. For the combinations of mechanisms that
provide the same security level, we choose the one that involves the minimal
number of security mechanisms. This is can be specified as follows:
n∧
i=1
(
more secure than(li, lj) ∨ (li = lj ∧ |CMi| < |CMj |)
)
(34)
8 Best mechanisms selection
In this section, we demonstrate how to to select the best combination of mech-
anisms to satisfy defined security policies using different steps presented in the
previous section. Due to the lack of space, proofs of this demonstration which
can be found in [2] will be omitted here. Consider two data owners O1 and O2
which store respectively two private tables T1(SSN,Age,Adress,Balance) and
T2(SSN, Job, ZIP, Salary). They want to integrate data stored in both tables.
In one side, O1 defined a policy P1 composed of two security constraints SC1,1 =
{withoutIDDisclosure(T1)} and SC2,1 = {SAttributeOf(T1, Balance)} and
two utility constraints UC1,1 = {provides(equality, Balance)} and UC2,1 =
{provides(addition,Balance)}. O1 specifies that the attribute SSN is an iden-
tifier attribute and that the attributes Age and Address are quasi-identifier
attributes. In another side, O2 defines a policy P2 composed of the security
constraint SC1,2 = {withoutIDDisclosure(T2)}. O2 specifies that the attribute
SSN is an identifier attribute and that the attributes Job and Zip are quasi-
identifier attributes. Suppose that all attributes in T1 and T2 are involved in the
join and that our toolbox is composed of the set of security mechanisms pre-
sented in 6.1 and 6.2, and two other mechanisms, rel join and tds representing
respectively the relational join operation and the top-down specialization mech-
anism [7]. Axiom 36 in [2] specifies the effects Σrel join of the application of
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rel join mechanism. Axiom 37 in [2] describes the effects Σtds of the appli-
cation of the mechanism tds. The first step to select the best combination of
mechanisms allowing to satisfy P1 and P2 while achieving the chosen goal con-
sists in selecting the set of mechanisms to achieve the chosen goal. According to
29, the mechanism rel join and tds can be applied to satisfy the jointure of the
private tables T1 and T2 (See Proof 1 in [2]).
After we select the set of mechanisms to satisfy the goal, we choose the best
goal satisfier from this set of mechanisms. In this demonstration, according to
Definition 4, the tds mechanism represents the best goal satisfier to join the
private tables T1 and T2 as it violates only SC2,1 (See Proof 2 in [2]. The
next step consists in finding the set of security properties to satisfy the violated
security constraints that rose from the application of the best goal satisfier. When
provided for the attribute Balance, the protection property protected can satisfy
the confidentiality constraint SC2,1 even when the tds mechanism is applied (See
Proof 3 in [2]. Next, we choose from our toolbox the combination of mechanisms
that can usefully satisfy the security constraint SC2,1. Two combinations of
mechanisms can usefully satisfy the security constraint SC2,1: (1) combines an
order-preserving encryption based mechanism and an homomorphic encryption
based mechanism, and (2) combines a deterministic encryption based mechanism
and an homomorphic encryption based mechanism (See Proof 4 in [2]. The
final step consists in choosing the best combination of mechanisms that can
usefully satisfy the security constraint SC2,1 which is (2) (See Proof 5 in [2]. In
conclusion, we can say that the application of the combination of mechanisms
(2) before the application of tds mechanism allows us to enforce defined security
policies P1 and P2 while joining the two tables T1 and T2.
9 Conclusion
We defined a well-founded language to select, from a toolbox containing a set of
security mechanisms, the best combination of security mechanisms allowing the
enforcement security and utility requirements for outsourced data. Our approach
can be improved by detecting the incompatibilities and conflicts between security
mechanisms to be able to decide which mechanisms can be applied together
without losing provided utility requirements.
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